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NOTES
rather than prohibiting the importation of materials denoted merely as
obscene, might be aimed at materials whose effect would be to cause lust-
ful thoughts or any specifically enumerated overt sexual conduct, such
as masturbation or the various sex crimes.
JENCKS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS: CONSCIENTI-
OUS OBJECTORS AND GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
In one of its more controversial decisions, the Supreme Court in
Jencks v. United States' held that in criminal prosecutions the Govern-
ment must release to the defense, upon request, pre-trial statements made
by government witnesses which "were of the events and activity related
in their testimony."2  Not only was the previous rule requiring the de-
fendant to lay a preliminary ground of inconsistency between the con-
tents of the report and the testimony before being entitled to inspect such
reports held to be in error,' but the accepted practice of the trial judge
examining the reports in camera, to determine their relevancy and ma-
teriality before turning them over to the defendant also was specifically
disapproved." Perhaps the chief reason for public dissension with re-
spect to this decision can be attributed to the dissent of Mr. Justice Clark
in which he warned: "Unless the Congress changes the rule announced
by the Court today, those intelligence agencies of our Government en-
gaged in law enforcement may as well close up shop for the Court has
opened their files to the criminal and thus offered him a Roman holiday
for rumaging through confidential information as well as vital national
secrets."'  The implication from this emotional language was two-fold.
1. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
2. Id. at 668.
3. Id. at 666. The Fifth Circuit, in deciding the Jencks case, 226 F.2d 540 (1955),
used this theory as the basis for denying the FBI report to Jencks. It based its holding
on Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414 (1953). The Supreme Court, however, held
that the reliance on Gordon was misplaced and that the proper interpretation of Gordon
was that "for production purposes, it need only appear that the evidence is relevant,
competent and outside any exclusionary rule." Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657,
667 (1957), quoting Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414, 420 (1953).
4. Jencks v. United States, supra note 3, at 669. For authority contra, see 8
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 117-18 (3d ed. 1940). For cases which had specifically held
that an in camera inspection by the court was proper, see, e.g., United States v. Grayson,
166 F2d 863 (2d Cir. 1948) ; United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946) ;
United States v. Cohen, 145 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944) ; United States v. Krulewitch, 145
F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944); United States v. Mesarosh, 116 F. Supp. 345 (D.D.C. 1953),
rev'd on othcr grounds, 352 U.S. 1 (1956).
5. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 681-82 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
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First, it pointed out the necessity for action to abate the decision, and
secondly, it specifically stated that Congress was the body to make the
change. If the view of the dissent is accepted, it necessarily follows that
the holding was not grounded upon due process in the constitutional
sense, but only set out the procedure to be followed by federal courts in
criminal cases under existing law.
A careful reading of the Jencks case indicates that there was little, if
any, justification for the conclusion of the dissent.6 However, the hold-
ing can be criticized because the Court failed to state who was to decide
if the information in a statement by a government witness "touched the
events and activity" related in his testimony. Subsequent federal court
decisions disagreed on this point. Some courts held that the Government
could not delete non-relevant portions, but had to produce an entire in-
vestigatory report to the defendant ;' other courts held to the contrary.'
Not one decision, however, held that the trial judge was the proper party
to make this decision.
Shortly after the Jencks opinion, Congress, incited to action by these
conflicting decisions and public opinion, enacted Public Law 85-269'
which purported to codify the Jencks decision. This statute provides that
any statement ordered to be produced which, in the opinion of the Govern-
ment, contains matter which does not relate to the subject matter of the
testimony of the witness shall be delivered to the court for inspecion
in camera.1" Since this enactment appears to be contrary to the holding
of the Jencks case," its constitutionality has been the subject of much dis-
6. The holding in the Jencks case is a very narrow one. A criminal (to use the
language of the dissent) is only entitled to the statement made by a government witness
who has already testified and which touches the subject matter of his testimony. This
holding certainly does not appear to open up the intelligence files to accused persons to
any extent. The dissent apparently forgot that the Government is not even required
to turn over the statement; it has the discretion to dismiss the case and maintain the
secrecy of the statement.
7. See the cases discussed in 2 U. S. Code Cong. and Adm. News 1864-68, 85th
Congress, 1st Session, 1957.
8. E.g., United States v. Anderson, 154 F. Supp 374 (E.D. Mo. 1957).
9. 71 Stat. 595 (1957), 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (Supp. V, 1958).
10. Upon receiving the statement the trial judge is to excise any portion which,
in his opinion, has no relation to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness.
If the defendant objects to such excision and the trial is continued to an adjudication of
his guilt, the complete statement must be preserved by the Government and, in the
event the defendant appeals, must be made available to the appellate court for the
purpose of determining the correctness of the ruling of the lower court. Ibid.
11. There is another possible conflict between the statute and the Jencks case.
Jencks requires the production of all oral statements taken by the Government as well
as all written statements touching the events and activities to which government wit-
nesses testified at the trial. The statute provides that if the record of the oral statement
is not a substantially verbatim recital the Government need not disclose it to the defendant.
71 Stat. 596 (1957), 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (e) (2) (Supp. V, 1958). This provision appears
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cussion and debate."2 In the Jencks case, after stating that the defendant
was entitled to inspect the report before the trial court saw it, the Court
concluded: "Justice requires no less."' 3 (Emphasis added.) This is very
strong language and smacks of due process. If the Government gives the
defendant less, as the congressional enactment appears to do, it would
seem to be a violation of due process. The strongest argument against
the conclusion that Jencks is based on due process is that the Court did
not once mention the term "due process." It might well be that the Court
based its decision upon purely procedural grounds under its common law
power to administer procedure for the federal courts when Congress has
not spoken. 4 If this be true, Congress has the power to change or modify
to authorize a means by which the Government could avoid disclosure in all cases-all it
need do is refuse to accept written statements and take care that the transcription of
all oral reports is not a substantially verbatim recital. Clearly this appears contrary
to the intent of the Jencks case. However, subsequent federal courts have not taken
this position or have avoided the issue. See United States v. Palermo, 258 F.2d 397
(2d Cir.), cert. granted, 358 U.S. 905 (1958) (No. 471, 1958 Term), where the defendant
requested production of a government agent's memorandum of what took place at a
meeting with the defendant's accountant who was called as a witness at the trial. The
court denied production on the ground that the memorandum was made from memory,
was not intended to be a substantially verbatim recital of anything said by the witness,
was merely a summary of the agent's recollection of what had transpired at the meeting,
and had not been signed, adopted, or approved by the witness. This reasoning clearly
begs the question. The issue under the statute is whether the memorandum is a sub-
stantially verbatim recital of the oral report-the intent of the recorder has little, if any,
bearing on the issue. Also the statement that the witness had not signed, adopted, or
approved the memorandum is not applicable in this case since such authentication is
only necessary when a written statement by the witness is involved. The court refused
to consider whether there is a conflict between the Jencks decision and the statute and
held that "the statute is the exclusive standard in this field and controls the procedure to
be followed in such cases." Id. at 400. The only reason the court assigned for this
conclusion was that "otherwise the legislation is meaningless." Ibid. Of course, the
legislation is meaningless if it is unconstitutional. It appears that this court has failed
to exercise proper judicial review. Cf. Bergman v. United States, 253 F.2d 933
(6th Cir. 1958) ; Lohman v. United States, 251 F.2d 951 (6th Cir. 1958); United States
v. Miller, 248 F.2d 163 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 905 (1957).
12. For writings taking the position that Jencks is based upon due process, see,
e.g., Keeffee, Jinks and Jencks: A Study of Jencks versus United States in Depth,
7 CArTH. U.L. REv. 91 (1958); Comment, 31 So. CAL. L. REv. 78 (1957); 29 GA. B.J.
273 (1957). For writings maintaining that Jencks only sets out criminal procedure,
see, e.g., Jalet, A Study in Administrative Law: The Power Reactor Development
Company Hearing Before the Atomic Energy Commission, 47 GEo. L.J. 47 (1958);
Comment, 67 YALE L.J. 674 (1958); Comment, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 110 (1957);
Comment, 35 U. DET. L.J. 207 (1957).
13. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 669 (1957).
14. See Scales v. United States, 260 F.2d 21 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 358 U.S. 917
(1958) (No. 489, 1958 Term) ; United States v. Spangelet, 258 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1958) ;
United States v. Angelet, 255 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v. Consolidated
Laundries Corp., 159 F. Supp. 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). See also United States v. Miller,
supra note 11. See generally McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1942), where
the Court stated: "Judicial supervision of the administration of criminal justice in
the federal courts implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards
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such a procedural rule. The basis of the Jencks case will remain a mys-
tery unless the Supreme Court explains it in some future case." How-
ever, the mandate that "justice requires no less" will be difficult to recon-
cile with a decision that Jencks only set out criminal procedure.
Although the primary question raised by the Jencks decision is one
of criminal due process, concomitantly, it raises the broader issue of the
possible conflict of fair procedure with national interest. There is prob-
ably no area of the law in which this conflict is more pervasive than in
administrative procedure. Thus, the salient consideration of this writing
is whether the Jencks doctrine is to be applied in proceedings before ad-
ministrative agencies; more specifically, in conscientious objector and
government employment proceedings. This consideration raises the
question of whether the Jencks ruling is sufficiently broad to be control-
ling in administrative hearings. In a National Labor Relation Board
hearing,'" a witness who had made a prior written statement to the Board
testified for the Government. This statement was requested by the re-
spondent for purposes of cross-examination with the Jencks case being
cited as authority. The Board denied the request on the ground that
Jencks was not controlling in administrative proceedings. However, a
cogent dissent posited that the "spirit and intent" of the Jencks case should
be followed in administrative hearings "so that the government's role in
the administration of justice may be above suspicion and reproach."' 1  In
a later case,' 8 in which the same issue was raised, the Second Circuit held
of procedure and evidence. Such standards are not satisfied merely by observance of
those minimal historic safeguards for securing trial by reasons which are summarized
as 'due process of law'. . . . In the exercise of its supervisory authority over the
administration of criminal justice in the federal courts . . . this Court has, from the
very beginning of its history, formulated rules of evidence to be applied in federal
criminal prosecutions." Id. at 340-41.
15. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in several cases which should settle
the question of the Jencks case. The chief issue presented by these cases is the holding of
a court of appeals that a district court's refusal to require the Government to produce
for the defendant's inspection summaries of interviews with government witnesses, even
if erroneous under Jencks, does not constitute reversible error since on retrial the
defendant would have no right to the statement under the new statute. Lev v. United
States, 258 F.2d 9 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 358 U.S. 903 (1958) (No. 435, 1958 Term) ;
Wool v. United States, 258 F.2d 9 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 358 U.S. 903 (1958) (No. 436,
1958 Term) ; Rubin v. United States, 258 F.2d 9 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 358 U.S. 903
(1958) (No. 437, 1958 Term). In Rosenberg v. United States, 257 F.2d 870 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. granted, 358 U.S. 904 (1958) (No. 471, 1958 Term), the specific question to be
decided is whether the rule in the Jencks case is one of mere procedure or whether it
involves a defendant's constitutional right.
16. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 1280 (1957).
17. Id. at 1284.
18. NLRB v. Adhesive Prods. Corp., 258 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1958). This
decision was accepted by the Board in Ra-Rich Mfg. Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. No. 90,
8 PIKE & FISCHER, ADMIN. LAW (2d) 428 (1958), in which the Board reversed the Tea
case and held that the Jencks case applied to Board proceedings.
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that, since Jencks required the production of statements in criminal cases,
logic compelled the conclusion that the rules of the Jencks case are applic-
able to administrative hearings. This issue was also raised in a hearing
before the Subversive Activities Control Board.19 It was the opinion of
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals that "simple justice" and the
"fundamentals of fair play" required the application of the Jencks case
in administrative hearings.2"
These decisions are not direct authority that the Jencks doctrine is to
be applied in all administrative hearings. It is important to note two
specific differences between the above cases and hearings involving con-
scientious objectors and government employees. First, the Government
made no claim of privilege in the above cases; whereas such a claim is
usually made in government employee cases. Secondly, the above cases
involved the calling of witnesses by the Government to testify before the
boards; in conscientious objector and government employee cases the
goevrnment merely submits the adverse information it has obtained from
witnesses to the boards. However, there is one major similarity which
must also be taken into consideration, namely that adjudicatory facts are
in issue in each of these hearings.2
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS
In this country persons who by reason of religious training and be-
lief conscientiously object to participation in any war are exempted from
military service.22 This immunization, however, is not derived from the
constitutional "freedom of religion" right but "arises solely through con-
gressional gTace, in pursuance of a traditional American policy of defer-
ence to conscientious objection. '23  To understand the problems that arise
in this area, it is necessary to be familiar with the procedure by which a
person may take advantage of this immunization.24 Under the present
law all male citizens upon reaching the age of eighteen are required to
19. See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 254 F.2d 314
(D.C. Cir. 1958).
20. Id. at 328.
21. For an excellent discussion of this point, see Davis, Requirement of a Trial Type
Hearing, 70 HARv. L. Rav. 193 (1956).
22. Universal Military Training and Service Act, 62 Stat. 604, 613 (1950), 50
U.S.C. § 456 (j) (1952). This exemption, however, may not be absolute. The registrant
may be inducted into non-combatant service if his only claim of exemption is from
combatant service or training. If he is also found to be conscientiously opposed to partici-
pation in non-combatant service, he may be required to perform civilian work con-
tributing to the maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest. Ibid.
23. Richter v. United States, 181 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
892 (1950).
24. This procedure is set out in detail in the Universal Military Training and
Service Act, suepra note 22.
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register with a local draft board. At this time, or any time before the
registrant reports for military duty, he may make a claim of conscientious
objection and request to be so classified. If the local draft board refuses
to accept a registrant's claim of conscientious objection, he may appeal
the classification to an appeal board. On receipt of the appeal, the appeal
board refers it to the Department of Justice for inquiry and hearing. The
FBI conducts the inquiry for the Department25 and forwards the results
to a hearing officer who conducts the hearing. The registrant has the
right to be present, to be represented by counsel, and to introduce evi-
dence in his own behalf. At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing
officer forwards a recommendation to the Department which in turn
makes a recommendation to the appeal board. The appeal board conducts
another hearing at which the registrant again has the right to present
evidence and to be represented by counsel. There is no direct judicial re-
view of the conclusion of the appeal board. Questions concerning the clas-
sification of the registrant may be raised only in a petition for habeas cor-
pus after a registrant has been inducted into the service, or as a defense
to a prosecution for failure to submit to induction into the armed forces.2"
Even under these circumstances, the scope of judicial review is very
limited, since a court can overturn the classification only if it has "no
basis in fact."
2 7
Although the scope of an appeal is quite limited, the right to two
separate hearings in the administrative procedure sphere would appear to
afford the registrant a fair hearing. There has been much controversy,
however, over the production of the FBI files to the registrant. In United
States v. Nugent8 the Supreme Court held that a registrant was only en-
titled to a fair r~sumi of all adverse information in the FBI report. The
Court did not reach the question of what constituted a fair r6sum , as it
found that Nugent was not denied any right. This holding was based on
the grounds that he had not requested the information from the hearing
officer and that there was no evidence that any information secured by
the FBI had been used by either the hearing officer or the appeal board."9
The Court also did not state who was to determine that the r~sumi was
fair or how it was to be determined. The Court did hold that the hearing
25. The Universal Military Training and Service Act, supra note 22, does not
dictate that the FBI shall conduct the inquiry-this is the practice adopted by the Depart-
ment of Justice.
26. Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375 (1954).
27. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122 (1945).
28. 346 U.S. 1 (1953).
29. Id. at n.10. The Court apparently assumed that if the hearing officer or the
appeal board had used any adverse information from the FBI report, they would have
mentioned it in their records.
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required by the statute" and by due process was not a full scale trial for
each appealing registrant.3
Judge Hincks maintained that the Nugent decision was unsatisfac-
tory because he could not conscientiously decide whether the r~sumi was
fair unless he had an opportunity to inspect the investigatory report it-
self.32 He also stated that, even if the r6sumi be deemed presumptively
fair, on trial the registrant should be able to combat the presumption by
the only possible means-comparison with the investigative report itself.3 "
The Ninth Circuit held that the requirement in the Nugent case that a
fair r~sum6 be furnished was obiter dictum, since Nugent had not re-
quested a fair r6sumi.34 It interpreted the Nugent case as only af firm-
ing the procedure of the Department of Justice in conducting the hear-
ing. The Fourth Circuit took a contrary view and held that where both
the local board and the appeal board had access to the actual FBI file, the
registrant was denied due process unless he had equal access to the files."
In a later case the Supreme Court defined fair r~sumi as "one which
will permit the registrant to defend against the adverse evidence-to ex-
plain it, rebut it or otherwise detract from its damaging force."36  The
30. The Court's reasoning on this point is rather confusing. The conclusion that
the statute does not require a "full scale trial" seems to be based on the reasoning that
the Department of Justice only advises and takes no action which is decisive. However,
it would seem that this advice itself, coming from such an important and impressive
agency, could be decisive in the final decision by the appeal board.
31. Again the* Court is not too explicit in its reasoning. It appears to be saying
that "the imperative needs of mobilization and national vigilance-when there is not
time for litigious interruptions" subordinates the due process requirement. Id. at 10.
But as Mr. Justice Frankfurter points out in his dissent, "The enemy is not yet so near
the gate that we should allow respect for traditions of fairness, which has heretofore
prevailed in this country, to be overborne by military exigencies." Id. at 13. Also it
would seem that the reasoning of the majority would apply only when there is actual
combat, and thus would not be applicable today.
32. United States v. Evans, 115 F. Supp. 340 (D. Conn. 1953).
33. Ibid.
34. White v. United States, 215 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1954). "We see nothing in the
requirements of the statute, or in the demands of due process, or in what was decided in
the Nugent case which would require that any portion of the FBI investigation undertaken
for these purposes should be made available to the registrant whether before the hearing
officer or at the time for prosecution for failure to submit to induction." Id. at 790.
35. Brewer v. United States, 211 F.2d 864 (4th Cir. 1954). It may be that this
case is reconcilable with the Nugent case. The Court in Nugent was careful to point
out that the FBI report was not transmitted to the appeal board. Nugent v. United
States, 346 U.S. 1, 6 n.10 (1953). See also United States v. Balogh, 157 F.2d 939 (2d Cir.
1947), judg. vacated on other grounds, 329 U.S. 692 (1946), where, under similar
circumstances, Judge L. Hand said: "As the case comes to us, the Board made use of
evidence of which Balogh [the registrant] may have been unaware, and which he had
no chance to answer: a prime requirement of any fair hearing." Id. at 943.
36. Simmons v. United States, 348 U.S. 397, 405 (1955). The Department of
Justice's recommendation disclosed that the FBI investigation had uncovered the follow-
ing information: (1) The registrant had been a heavy drinker and crap shooter in and
around local taverns and pool halls prior to becoming a Jehovah Witness. (2) The
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Court specifically pointed out that due process was not involved and that
the Court was only endeavoring to apply a procedure, set forth by Con-
gress, in accordance with the statutory plan and basic fairness which
underlies all legislation.37 Furthermore, the Court held the requirement
of a fair rdsumi of adverse evidence could not be waived. It said that
the discussion in the Nugent case on this point was directed at the avail-
ability of the rdsumi and not at the -time or method of requesting it.3"
Subsequently the Supreme Court held that a registrant was entitled to a
copy of the Department of Justice's recommendation to the appeal board
since he must be aware of all the facts before the board as well as the
overall position of the Department if he is to present his case effectively
to the appeal board.39
Thus the state of law prior to the Jencks case was that a registrant
registrant was arrested May 29, 1950, on a complaint by his wife that he pulled her out
of his car and hit her in the face. (3) One June 12, 1950, the police were called to
settle a hot argument between the registrant and his wife. (4) His wife called the
police on Jan. 6, 1952, and claimed that the registrant was abusive. As to the alleged
gambling and drinking, the hearing officer merely told the registrant that he was
reported to have been hanging around pool rooms. As to the reported incidents of
violence and abuse towards his wife, the hearing officer only asked the registrant's
wife how he was treating her. The court held that "the remarks of the hearing officer
at most amounted to vague hints" and certainly did not afford the registrant "fair notice
of the adverse charges in the report." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 404-05. See text
accompanying note 74 infra.
37. 348 U.S. at 404-05. The Court's reasoning on this point is rather mystifying.
Most argumnts that rely on due process contend that the complete FBI file should be
transmitted to the registrant to enable him to determine if the r~sum6 is fair. The Court
here indicates that if the production of a fair r~sum6 were based on due process, the
registrant would have to show prejudice specifically in order to question the fairness of
the r~sum6. This Court, however, states that since the right is a statutory one, the
failure of the Department to furnish a fair r~sum6 to the registrant automatically denies
him a fair hearing. See also Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in the Nugent case, 346
U.S. 1, 13 (1953).
38. This holding appears to be an obvious dodge to avoid the language of the
Nugent case. In Nitgent, the Court stated that it did not reach the question of what con-
stituted a fair r~sum6 since the registrant could not complain of any failure on the part
of the Department to supply him with a summary of the evidence. The reason for this
was that "in view of this [the fact that the record before the appeal board contained
no evidence secured by the FBI] and in view of his failure to make any request to the
Hearing Officer, we think that Nugent was not denied any right." United States v.
Nugent, 346 U.S. 1, 6 n.10 (1953). The reasoning of the Court in Simmons that the
above language only went to the "availability" of the summary and not "the time or
method of requesting" it is difficult to perceive. This case would have been in con-
formity with Nugent if it had found that the Nugent case held that a waiver took place
only when two factors were present: (1) no request for the information and (2) no
transmission of adverse information to the appeal board. This would not have affected
the decision in the Simmons case since adverse information had been transmitted to the
appeal board.
39. Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407 (1955). "Just as the right to a hearing
means the right to a meaningful hearing . . . so the right to file a statement before
the appeal board includes the right to file a meaningful statement, one based on the
facts in the file and with an awareness of the recommendations and arguments to be
countered." Id. at 415.
NOTES
was entitled to a fair r6sumi of the FBI report which right could not be
waived, and he was also entitled to a copy of the Department-of Justice's
recommendation to the appeal board. Even if the definition of a fair
r~sum6 is a workable one, the questions of who is to decide iiitially if
the r~sum- is fair and how it is to be decided remain unanswered. As
could be expected, after the decision in the Jencks case, registrants cited it
as authority for demanding the complete FBI report. One district court
had provisionally granted the Government's motion to quash a supoena
duces tecum ordering production of the FBI report.4" With the advent
of the Jencks case, however, it withdrew the ruling and denied the mo-
tion on the ground that the registrant, in a criminal trial for refusing to
be inducted, was entitled to test the accuracy of the rdsum- at least to the
extent of comparing it with the FBI report to determine whether the
r~sum6 fairly reflected the contents of the report. The Nugent case was
distinguished on the ground that it only applied to the procedure during
the administrative proceeding phase, while this case brought forth the
question of the proper procedure during the criminal trial phase.41 The
court was also of the opinion that the shift in the attitude of the Supreme
Court between the Nugent and Jencks decisions implied that Nugent
might be overruled were the problem to arise again.42 While agreeing
that the Jencks case did not deal with the instant problem, the court stated
that the underlying principle expressed there is equally applicable here:, t
was the court's view that the concept of justice announced in the Jencks
case required the FBI reports in their original form, not mere summaries,
to be transmitted to the registrant.
Other federal courts refused to accept this reasoning. Thus it was
subsequently held that the Jencks case could not govern selective service
cases since there is a sharp distinction between demands for production of
FBI reports in conscientious objector cases and applications by defend-
ants in ordinary criminal cases to examine statements made to the FBI
by witnesses called to the stand by the Government.43 The court agreed
that the fairness and completeness of a r~sumi could not be judged easily
without looking at the documents it purported to summarize, but was of
40. United States v. Jacobson, 154 F. Supp. 103 (W.D. Va. 1957).
41. Since a review can also be had in a habeas corpus proceeding, query if this
court would require the production of the FBI files in such a case. Also this court
apparently refused to accept, or chose to ignore, the reasoning of its court of appeals
which had stated: "We refuse to believe that the Court [in the Nu gent case] labored
and brought forth a mouse of a decision that the hearing officer need not show the FBI
report when the situation was such that the trial court must necessarily admit it."
White v. United State, 251 F.2d 782, 791 (9th Cir. 1954).
42. United States v. Jacobson, 154 F. Supp. 103, 106 (W.D. Va. 1957).
43. 247 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1957).
449
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the opinion that the Nugent case held that the fairness of the r~sumi
must be presumed."
It appears as if the Jencks case only created more confusion in this
area and left unanswered the question of whether the doctrine of justice
there formulated should be applied in selective services cases. The Su-
preme Court has offered no reasons why the registrant should be denied
access to the FBI report except the statement that neither due process nor
the statute require it.45 The Ninth Circuit advanced the following theory:
"'It is a matter of common knowledge that if the FBI is to obtain from
neighbors or acquaintances of the registrant a report on which it can
rely, it is essential that frankness on the part of persons interviewed be
encouraged by assurance that identity will not be divulged.' A favorable
report by a neighbor who expects to have his identity disclosed to the
registrant would not be worth much."4  The logic of this position is
questionable. It can be argued with as much logic that an adverse report
by a neighbor who expects not to have his identity disclosed would not be
worth much.
The Government seldom, if ever, makes a claim of privilege in con-
scientious objector hearings." Consequently, there appears to be no
valid reason for denying the production of FBI reports to the registrant.
It is very doubtful if matters involving national interest or state secrets
are involved in any of these reports. The informers in such cases will
usually be the neighbors and acquaintances of the registrant. If they are
willing to make an adverse statement about him, they should be willing
to be confronted and cross-examined as to the veracity of such informa-
tion. Rumor mongers and tale-bearers are at their best when they know
44. See also Bouziden v. United States, 251 F.2d 728 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 927 (1958) ; United States v. Manke, 158 F. Supp. 764 (D. Md. 1958) ; United
States v. Gordon, 158 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. IIl. 1957).
45. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in the Nugent case where he states that
the Court is not called upon to devise a just procedure in this area but merely to apply
one. It was his contention that the Court "ought not to reject a construction of
congressional language which assures justice in cases where the sincerity of another's
religious conviction is at stake and where prison may be the alternative to an abandon-
ment of conscience." United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1953).
46. White v. United States, 215 F.2d 782, 790 n.11 (9th Cir. 1954).
47. The so-called "informer's privilege" does not appear to be applicable in this
area. The Supreme Court in Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), stated:
"What is usually referred to as the informer's privilege is in reality the Government's
privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish information
of violations of law to officers charged with enforcement of that law. The purpose
of the privilege is the furtherance and protection of the public interest in effective law
enforcement. The privilege recognizes the obligation of citizens to communicate their
knowledge of the commission of crimes to law-enforcement officials and, by preserving
their anonymity, encourages them to perform that obligation." (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 59.
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that their stories will never be questioned."
The main difference between conscientious objector hearings and
other administrative hearings in which it has been held that the Jencks
doctrine governs is that the Government presents no witnesses in the
former. This distinction seems to manifest a greater need for disclosure
of statements in conscientious objector hearings since the registrant
does not have the opportunity to confront and cross-examine the wit-
nesses. In the interest of justice the registrant should be entitled to in-
spect all of the facts in the FBI report except to the extent that some
compelling national interest clearly necessitates that some particular evi-
dence or is source remain confidential.
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
In 1892 Mr. Justice Holmes said that a person "may have a con-
stitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a
policeman."' This theory that public employment is a privilege was
long, and still may be, the guiding light in the controversial area of gov-
ernment employment. It has taken on significant importance since World
War n due to the added emphasis placed on the so-called loyalty pro-
grams. The chief issue herein is whether a government employee may
be discharged summarily because of doubtful loyalty without being given
the chance to know and to meet the evidence against him.
The leading case in this area is Bailey v. Richardson" which was a
four-to-four affirmance of a two-to-one decision resting upon the privi-
lege doctrine and public interest. Miss Bailey was discharged from gov-
ernment service because it was the opinion of the Loyalty Board that she
was disloyal to the Government. She was informed by letter from the
Regional Loyalty Board of the Civil Service Commission that it had re-
ceived information to the effect that she had or had had various com-
munist affiliations. Miss Bailey denied all allegations, except past mem-
bership for a short time in the American League for Peace and Democ-
racy, which was on the Attorney General's subversive list. A hearing
before the Regional Board was granted at her request at which she pre-
sented the only evidence and was not permitted to know the names of her
48. See the dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas in the Nugent case in which he states:
"The use of statements by informers who need not confront the person under investiga-
tion or accusation has such an infamous history that it should be rooted out from our
procedure. . . . We should be done with this practice-whether the life of a man is
at stake, or his reputation or any matter touching upon his status or right." Nugent
v. United States, 346 U.S. 1,13-14 (1953).
49. McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
50. 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 341
U.S. 918 (1951).
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accusers or to cross-examine them. Miss Bailey contended that the due
process clause of the fifth amendment required that she be afforded a
hearing of the quasi-judicial type before being dismissed. The District
of Columbia Court of Appeals stated: "It has been held repeatedly and
consistently that Government employ is not 'property' and that in this
particular it is not a contract. We are unable to perceive how it could be
held to be 'liberty.' Certainly it is not life. . . . Due process of law is
not applicable unless one is being deprived of something to which he has
a right." 1  Judge Edgerton, dissenting, argued that the premise that
government employment was a privilege did not support the conclusion
that it might be granted on condition that certain economic or political
ideas not be entertained.52
The majority, holding also that public interest validated the sum-
mary action, said that disloyalty in the government service under present
circumstances is a matter of great public concern and that individual
rights guaranteed by the Constitution did not necessarily mean that a
Government dedicated to those rights could not preserve itself in the cur-
rent world. 3 The dissent pointed out that this was a valid position, but
that it had no bearing in this case since Miss Bailey was occupying a non-
sensitive position and a suspicion of disloyalty in no way indicated a
risk to national security. Thus, the dissent found no conflict of interest
between the Government and the individual but instead a coincidence of
interest in a fair trial. The dissent concluded: "The ominous theory
that the right of fair trial ends where the defense of security begins is
irrelevant. . . . Whatever her actual thoughts may have been, to oust
her as disloyal without trial is to pay too much for protection against any
harm that could possibly be done in such a job. We cannot preserve our
liberties by sacrificing them."5  Both opinions attempted to weigh the
public interest against the interest of the individual. The difference in
conclusion arose because the dissent concluded that Miss Bailey's position
was a non-sensitive one, a fact which the majority chose to ignore.
The Supreme Court wrote no opinions in the Bailey case, but some
of the Justices took the opportunity to comment upon it in another case 5
which was decided the same day. Mr. Justice Reed expressed the more
commonly accepted view that government employees under investigation
51. Id. at 57.
52. Id. at 72 (dissenting opinion).
53. Id. at 64-65.
54. Id. at 74 (dissenting opinion).
55. 341 U.S. 123 (1951) (opinion of Burton, J.). A majority of five, each writing
a separate opinion, held that the Attorney General could not place an organization on
the subversive list without giving it a chance to be heard.
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have never had the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and
as long as an employee has notice and the opportunity to explain his
actions, he has been accorded all of the protection required by the Con-
stitution."0 Mr. Justice Douglas, however, warned:
The problem of security is real; and the Government need
not be paralyzed in handling it. The security problem, however,
relates only to those sensitive areas where secrets are or may
be available, where critical policies are being formulated, or
where sabotage can be committed. . . . The British have
[adopted] . . . the loyalty procedure only in sensitive areas
and [use it] to test the qualifications of an employee for a par-
ticular post, not to condemn him for all public employment.
When we go beyond that procedure and adopt the dragnet sys-
tem now in force, we intrench upon the civil rights of our peo-
ple. . . . Of course, no one has a constitutional right to a
government job. But every citizen has a right to a fair trial
when his government seeks to deprive him of the privileges of
first-class citizenship. 7
Parker v. Lester"5 and Dressler v. Wilsoi59 are decisions that make
56. Id. at 208-09 (dissenting opinion).
57. Id. at 181-82 (concurring opinion). In 1955 the Supreme Court once again
had an opportunity to clarify the law in this area in Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331
(1955). Dr. Peters was employed as a Special Consultant in the United States Public
Health Service of the Federal Security Agency. His work was not of a confidential or
sensitive character and did not entail access to classified material. From 1949-1953 he
had been twice subjected to investigations and hearings pertaining to his loyalty and
had been cleared both times by the Agency Board. In 1953 the Loyalty Review Board
decided to reopen the case on its own motion and hold another hearing. The only
evidence adduced was presented by Dr. Peters. He was not permitted to know the
name of his accusers or to cross-examine them. In fact the Review Board itself did
not know the identity of all of the informers and admitted that the information was not
given under oath. Nevertheless, the Review Board determined that on all of the
evidence there was reasonable doubt as to Dr. Peter's loyalty to the Government. The
Supreme Court, avoiding the constitutional issue, held that in reopening the case the
Review Board had exceeded its power under the executive order creating it. The effect
of this decision is that Bailey v. Richardson still stands and that the Government can
continue to dismiss employees, regardless of the fact that they do not occupy sensitive
positions, for loyalty reasons without affording them the opportunity to know and to
meet the evidence against them. The Court might well have followed the advice of
Mr. Justice Black that the rule that the Court will not decide constitutional questions in
cases which can be adequately disposed of on non-constitutional grounds "should not be
treated as though it were an inflexible rule to be inexorably followed under all circum-
stances." Id. at 349 (concurring opinion). This area of the law is one of confusion
and one in which there is a major conflict betxveen the interest of the public and the
interest of the individual. The more reasonable approach, especially when the con-
stitutional question is adequately argued by opposing counsel as it was in this case,
would seem to be that the Court ought to make an exception in such a case.
58. 227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955).
59. 155 F. Supp. 373 (D.D.C. 1957).
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a complicated situation almost incomprehensible. In the Parker case the
Commandant of the Coast Guard issued an order that seamen must have
security clearance to serve on merchant vessels. The Magnuson Act
authorizes the Commandant to issue security clearances if he is "satis-
fied that. . . the presence of the individual on board would not be inimi-
cal to the security of the United States."6  Parker had been denied
clearance after a hearing which did not include the presentation of evi-
dence against him.6 The court of appeals stated the question in issue
as follows: "Is this system of secret informers, whisperers and tale-
bearers of such vital importance to the public welfare that it must be
preserved at the cost of denying the citizen even a modicum of the pro-
tection traditionally associated with due process ?"62 The court pointed out
that seamen were not government employees and thus Bailey v. Riclwrd-
son was not applicable. It held that such a system of screening violated
due process and that "the time has not come when we have to abandon
a system of liberty for one modeled on that of the communists."" Un-
fortunately, the Solicitor General did not seek Supreme Court review of
this decision, and there is now a double standard. The constitutional
rights of seamen entitle them to be given the opportunity to know and
meet the evidence against them,64 while government employees have no
such constitutional right.
In Dressler v. Wilsone' a private contractor entered into a contract
with the Defense Department, by which it was to construct secret instal-
lations. Another agreement between the parties obligated the contractor
to provide a system of security controls, and Dressler's name was sub-
mitted to the Defense Department for clearance. He was denied security
clearance because it was alleged that he had been an active participant in
the activities of the Milwaukee branch of the Socialist Workers Party,
an organization on the subversive list of the Attorney General. Dressler
was accorded a hearing by the Defense Department at which he ques-
tioned the jurisdiction of the board, offered no evidence, and declined to
answer certain questions propounded to him. The private contractor
then discharged him.66 Dressler contended that the procedure which de-
60. 64 Stat. 427 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §§ 191, 192, 194 (1952).
61. For an excellent discussion of the problems in this area prior to the Parker
case, see Brown & Fassett, Security Tests for Maritime Workers: Due Process Under
the Port Security Program, 62 YALE L.J. 1163 (1953).
62. 227 F.2d at 719.
63. Id. at 721.
64. At least this is true in the Ninth Circuit.
65. 155 F. Supp. 373 (D.D.C. 1957).
66. See generally Comment, Loyalty and Private Employment: The Right of
Employers to Discharge Suspected Subversives, 62 YALE LJ. 954 (1953).
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nied him clearance was contrary to due process. The court had grave
doubts if due process applied to the question of whether a person should
receive government employment. Even if constitutional due process did
apply the court said that what constitutes due process for one purpose
does not necessarily constitute due process for a different purpose.
Furthermore, it held that due process only requires confrontation with
witnesses in criminal trials and that an administrative hearing in which
a party is given an opportunity to answer questions, to offer testimony,
and to make any explanation affords him due process.6"
This case can not be reconciled with Parker v. Lester. The Parker
case pointed out that a seaman was not a government employee, while,
strangely, the Dressier case apparently assumed that an employee of a pri-
vate firm which was performing a government contract was a govern-
ment employee or had the same status as a government employee."s What-
ever distinction can be made between the two groups certainly does not
appear to be of such significance to require or permit different results in
regard to the right of knowing and meeting evidence in a security clear-
ance proceeding. 9
A congressional enactment of August 26, 1950, gave the heads of
certain departments summary and unreviewable dismissal power over
their civilian employees in sensitive positions when such heads deemed
dismissal necessary or advisable "in the interest of the national security
of the United States."7  The issue of whether the hearing provided by
an agency pursuant to the act afforded due process was raised in the
67. 155 F. Supp. at 375-76.
68. The Government argued in the Dressier case that if there were any controversy,
it was between Dressler and his former employer. The court, however, stated that it
was "unnecessary to reach the question whether a justiciable controversy exists in this
case because it [the court] is predicating its decision upon matters that are more
fundamental and that go to the merits." Id. at 376. Apparently the court was speaking
of the lack of the right of a government [defense-contract?] employee to have a trial
type hearing in a clearance proceeding.
69. It should be pointed out that the opportunity for espionage and sabotage in our
ports and on merchant vessels is possibly as great as in any other area in which com-
munists are likely to attempt to infiltrate.
70. 64 Stat. 476 (1950), 5 U.S.C. § 22-1 (1952). The act as expressly made
applicable only to specific departments which were directly concerned with security.
Section 3 of the act, however, provides that the act may be extended "to such other de-
partments and agencies of the Government as the President may, from time to time,
deem necessary in the best interests of national security." The President extended the
act under this authority "to all other departments and agencies of the Government."
Exec. Order No. 10491, 18 Fed. Reg. 6583 (1953). In Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536(1956), the Court held that an agency determination that a dismissal was "in the interest
of the national security of the United States" was not sufficient-the agency must also
specifically find that the employee was occupying a sensitive position. Id. at 551.
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case of Colemanw v. Brucker."' Coleman occupied a sensitive position and
was accorded a hearing when his loyalty was questioned. He was not
confronted with adverse evidence at this hearing and contended that he
was entitled to a trial type hearing. The court said that since the Govern-
ment constitutionally could discharge an employee at whim or will, no
removal procedure had to meet constitutional due process.72  As to the
interpretation of the word "hearing" in the statute, the court said that it
merely meant that an opportunity was to be given to a party to answer
charges, to give an explanation, and to introduce evidence." This is
rather an unrealistic position. Charges must be specific if one is to
answer with any defense other than a general denial. To explain often
times requires knowledge of who the witnesses and accusers are. To
present evidence necessitates knowing against whom or what to present
evidence. If the charges are not specific and the identity of the accuser
not disclosed, the best defense that can be mustered is a general denial
and the presentation of character witnesses. 4 It also must be remembered
that this statute is only applicable to employees who occupy "sensitive"
positions, and any cases decided under it are not applicable to employees
who occupy non-sensitive positions.
It is doubtful if anyone would question the right of the Government
to discharge an employee for inefficiency without a trial type hearing.
The question remaining is whether a discharge for loyalty reasons is of
a sufficiently different nature to require such a hearing. Practically
speaking, it would appear so. Once an individual is branded a subversive
the stigma is almost impossible to efface. It is not plausible to believe
that an employee discharged from one agency for security reasons would
be able to find employment in another government agency. Private em-
ployers avoid the employment of such persons for fear of being tagged
"communists sympathizers." One commentator states that if the em-
ployee is a young man, "he winds up in some recognizable marginal job,
such as dishwashing or unskilled labor"; if the employee is middle aged,
71. 156 F. Supp. 126 (D.D.C. 1957).
72. "In other words, procedural due process . . . obviously is inapplicable to re-
moval of employees from government service." Id. at 128.
73. Ibid.
74. See Mr. Justice Douglas's concurring opinion in Joint Anti-Facists Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 180 (1951); Note, 45 CAUiF. L. REV. 524 (1957).
Cf. Boudin v. Dulles, 136 F. Supp. 218 (D.D.C. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 235 F.2d
532 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (a passport case), where the court said: "How can an applicant
refute charges which arise from sources, or are based upon evidence, which is closed to
him? What good does it do him to be apprised that a passport is denied him due to
association or activities disclosed or inferred from State Department files even if he is
told of the associations and activities in a general way? What files? What evidence?
Who made the inferences? From what materials were those inferences made?" Id. at 221.
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"he may end up on the industrial scrap heap."75
The fact that an employee dismissed for security reasons is seriously
injured, not only in reputation but economically as well, is now fully ad-
mitted by the courts.76 The question is whether there is any remedy for
this injury. If the privilege doctrine is relied upon, there is no remedy.
Although there has been no Supreme Court decision directly on point,
dicta in two recent cases indicate that the privilege doctrine will not pass
the test of substantive due process. In Wieman v. Updegraff7 all state
employees were required to take a test oath. The Supreme Court held
that the statute offended due process because of indiscriminate classifica-
tion of innocent with knowing association or membership in such organi-
zations."5 The Court avoided the question of whether there is a right to
public employment by stating, "We need not pause to consider whether
an abstract right to public employment exists. It is sufficient to say that
constitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose exclu-
sion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory.""' This
being true, it can be argued that a discharge for security reasons without
the opportunity to know and meet adverse evidence would be arbitrary
and thus would offend due process.
In Slochower v. Board of Higher Education"0 the Court held that
there was a violation of due process where an employee was summarily
dismissed under a statute which authorized dismissal if a government
employee invoked the privilege against self incrimination to avoid answer-
ing a question relating to his official conduct before a legislative com-
mittee." In speaking of the right to government employment, the Court
stated: "The problem of balancing the State's interest in the loyalty of
those in its service with the traditional safeguards of individual rights is
a continuing one. To state that a person does not have a constitutiowal
right to government employment is only to say that he must comply with
reasonable, lawful, and non-discriminatory terms laid down by the proper
authorities."s2 (Emphasis added.) The essence of this language indi-
75. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 92-94 (1954). This fact
is shockingly illustrated in Greene v. McElroy, 254 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted,
358 U.S. 872 (1958) (No. 180, 1958 Term). Greene, before being denied security clear-
ance, earned $18,000 per year plus bonuses as vice-president of an engineering corpora-
tion. After he was discharged for failure to receive security clearance, the best job he
was able to obtain was that of an architectural draftsman at the salary of $4,400 per year.
76. Greene v. McElroy, supra note 75.
77. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
78. Id. at 191.
79. Id. at 192.
80. 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
81. Id. at 559.
82. Id. at 555.
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cates that the Court considers government employment a right, since all
constitutional rights are subject to reasonable, lawful, and nondiscrimina-
tory terms laid down by the proper authorities. Later in the same case,
however, the Court pointed out that it was not holding that Slochower
had a constitutional right to government employment." This contradic-
tory language would seem to indicate that the Court is willing to sub-
ordinate the privilege doctrine in the interest of justice and sound public
policy.
The Court in the two immediately preceding cases avoided the
privilege-right question and held that a government employee could not
be arbitrarily discharged without a proper inquiry. Whether a "proper
inquiry" includes the right to know and meet adverse evidence is still
uncertain. Mr. Justice Douglas believes that government employment is
a right-a right to work-and when such employees are discharged with-
out a trial-type hearing, they have been deprived of liberty within the
meaning of the fifth amendment.8 He sums up his position by stating,
"Those who see the force of this position counter by saying that the
government's sources of information must be protected if the campaign
against subversives is to be successful. The answer is plain. If the
sources of information need protection, they should be kept secret. But
once they are used to destroy a man's reputation and deprive him of his
'liberty,' they must be put to the test of due process of law. The use of
faceless informers is wholly at war with that concept."8
This position and the one enunciated in the Bailey case set forth the
extremes. Reason dictates that neither need be accepted. In weighing
the interest of the individual against the interest of national security, it
is not necessary to come up with an answer entirely in favor of the one or
the other. For example, if in the Bailey case the Government had ob-
tained adverse information about her from her neighbors, her fellow-
workers, and also from secret agents in the communist party, the Govern-
ment should have been required to disclose the names of her fellow-
workers and neighbors, but should have been privileged to keep confi-
dential the names of their secret agents and the information they obtained,
if it would have revealed the source. The disclosure of the names of her
neighbors and fellow-workers would not have had an effect on national
security, while the disclosure of the secret agents may have had such an
effect. It is to be expected that this system would prevent investigative
agencies from receiving a certain kind of information and that some
83. Id. at 559.
84. Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 352 (1955) (concurring opinion).
85. Ibid.
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people would be discouraged from carrying rumors and suspicions to
these bodies. Nevertheless these agencies should be able to perform their
duties in this area just as they are able to obtain proof for criminal prose-
cutions which require confrontation. Surely it is better that these agen-
cies suffer some handicap than that innocent citizens be branded as sub-
versives."0 Such a solution would appear to follow the concept of justice
as enunciated in the Jencks case. Non-disclosure only in those instances
where national security would be affected and where the Government has
a legitimate claim of privilege would bring these hearings in line with the
cases that have held that the fencks doctrine is applicable to administra-
tive hearings."7
The foregoing compromise as to what evidence should be made
available solves only half of the problem; the remaining half involves the
determination of who is to decide if the release of certain information or
the name of an informer would adversely affect national security. It
has been suggested that a single statute be enacted in the area of govern-
ment employment to cover the clearance, hiring, and removal of govern-
ment employees for security reasons.88 Under such a statute the pro-
posed agency could consider evidence, the source and content of which
had not been made available to the accused, only upon the affidavit of
the Attorney General of the United States that disclosure would jeopar-
dize the security of the United States. Such a procedure, if adopted,
would appear to protect adequately both the interest of the government
and the individual.
One commentator suggests that the question might be determined
by an independent agency or board appointed specially for such purpose.8 9
While this method theoretically may have many advantages,"0 it has been
criticized on the ground that there would not be sufficient business
brought before such an agency to justify its existence.9
Those who fear placing such discretion in the hands of an agency
or agency head advocate that the information be subject to an in camera
86. See Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708, 720 (9th Cir. 1955).
87. Note that the Jencks case pointed out that in civil cases "it is unquestionably
true that the protection of vital national interest may militate against public disclosure
of documents in the Government's possession." 353 U.S. 657, 670 (1957).
88. Mankiewicz, Mangum, & Moody, The Federal Loyalty-Security Program:
A Proposed Statute, 44 CAIF. L. REv. 72 (1956).
89. Sanford, Evidentiary Privileges Against the Production of Data Within the
control of Executive Departments, 3 VAND. L. Rxv. 73 (1949).
90. Note, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 737 (1956) suggests that it would have the advantage
of combining "the expertise of the administrative agency with the impartiality of a court."
Id. at 748.
91. Ibid. To the same effect, see Sanford, supra note 89, at 95. Sanford also
states that this method would be subject to the same advantages and disadvantages as
determination by the head of the respective department or agency. Ibid.
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inspection by the trial judge with the usual appellate review.92 Such a
proposal would require the clearance of all federal judges for the in-
formation to retain its confidential classification. Theoretically this
would be sound but its practicality is doubted. Some judges probably
would be denied clearance, and the question of the procedure to be used
in clearing judges would be raised. Such a proposal is also subject to the
criticism that a judge lacks the expert knowledge to decide whether the
disclosure of information would have an adverse effect on national
security.93
The more practical, and perhaps the best, proposal is that of the
New York City Bar Association's Special Committee.9 It would require
that disclosure of information and informers be made unless the head of
the agency which obtained the information certified that disclosure would
be detrimental to national security. This would demand of the agency
head more than the mere summary approval of some subordinate's recom-
mendation. It would have to be the personal decision of the agency
head.99 This solution is subject to the criticism that such discretion could
not be checked by the courts and would still leave an individual subject to
arbitrary power. However, the integrity and honesty of judges are ac-
cepted in many areas. In this situation where national interest is seriously
affected, at some point individual interest must give way to the overrid-
ing interest of the government and the integrity and honesty of the
agency head accepted. 6
CONCLUSION
The intent and rationale of the Jencks case is that the Government
must not be out to win a case at any cost but that justice must be done.
No one would seriously argue that the Government has any valid interest
in withholding information that may acquit an accused.9" The relation-
92. Sanford, supra note 89. Cf. Comment, An Informer's Tale: Its Use in JIudicial
and Administrative Proceedings, 63 YALE L.J. 206 (1953).
93. Duncan v. Cammel Laird and Co., [1942] A.C. 624, 641.
94. Special Committee on the Federal Loyalty-Security Program, Association of
the Bar of City of New York, Final Report 177 (1956).
95. Professor Davis suggests that in case the agency heads should follow the
past practice of automatically certifying that disclosure would be detrimental to national
security, "perhaps a panel of three court-of-appeals judges, specially cleared for the
purpose, could be appointed to determine when disclosure of informants would not be
detrimental to national security." Davis, Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70
HAXv. L. Rxv. 193, 242 n.180 (1956).
96. Brown takes the position that "the whole loyalty apparatus, outside the field
of sensitive employment, does more harm than good, and ought to be swept away."
BROWN, LOYALTY AND SECURITY 381 (1958).
97. This conclusion would appear to be true even where vital national interest
would be adversely affected. In such cases the Government should either disclose the
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ship of the Government and an accused is on an entirely different basis
from that of a defendant and plaintiff in a civil action. In criminal cases
the sixth amendment commands that an accused come forward and make
himself known to the accused regardless of the fact that the disclosure
of the accuser may have an adverse effect on national security. The
Jencks case only provides for the complete application of this rule by al-
lowing the accused all pertinent information given by the accuser and
adverse witnesses to enable the accused to defend himself adequately.
No such rule is applicable in the administration of justice in admin-
istrative hearings. It would appear, however, that the interest of the
Government does not change. It has no interest in winning a case but at
all times is primarily interested in seeing that justice is dispensed. All
pertinent information that the Government has, when it is a party to an
administrative hearing, should be made available to an accused except to
the extent that such an interest as national security clearly requires that
particular evidence or its source not be disclosed. While the Jencks case
is not directly applicable in hearings where no witnesses are presented by
the Government, it is important in that it may well be a sign post point-
ing toward disclosure in such cases. At least it positively demonstrates
that FBI reports are not sacrosanct.
Administrative proceedings are a part of the judicial system of this
country and any adverse comment or feeling as to their administration
of justice reflects on the entire judicial system. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, in speaking of the administration of justice said: "The untainted
administration of justice is certainly one of the most cherished aspects of
our institution. Its observance is one of our proudest boasts.
[F]astidious regard for the honor of the administration of justice re-
quires the Court to make certain that the doing of justice be so manifest
that only irrational or perverse claims of its disregard can be asserted.""3
This mandate should be followed to its most extreme limits.
In all administrative hearings in which adjudicatory facts are in
issue, the interest of the government in maintaining the confidential na-
information or drop the charges. As Mr. Justice Brennen stated: "The burden is the
Government's, not to be shifted to the trial judge, to decide whether the public prejudice
of allowing a crime to go unpunished is greater than that attendant upon the possible
disclosure of state secrets and other confidential information in the Government's
possession." Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 672 (1957). See also People v. Davis,
52 Mich. 569, IS N.W. 362 (1884), in which the court asserted it is the state's interest
"that accused parties shall be acquitted unless upon all the facts they are seen to be
guilty; and if there shall be in the possession of any of its officers information that can
legitimately tend to overthrow the case made for the prosecution, or to show that it is
unworthy of credence, the defense should be given the benefit of it." Id. at 573-74,
18 NAV. at 363.
98. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115, 125 (1955).
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ture of its files must be weighed not only against the interest of an in-
dividual in a fair hearing but also against the public interest in the fair
administration of justice."9 In hearings where the effect of the deter-
mination goes far beyond the sanction of the hearing itself, as in the
discharge of an employee for security reasons, it is urged that the Govern-
ment should be entitled to maintain the secrecy of its files only when
public policy so dictates in the interest of national security.' If due
process does not command such a procedure, and the Court is unwilling
to demand it, then public policy should require it in the character of a
congressional enactment.
POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF THE FIRST PROVISO TO SECTION 9 (a)
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
Section 9 (a) of the National Labor Relations Act as originally
enacted provided:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representa-
tives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment. Provided,
that any individual employee or a group of employees shall have
the right at any time to present grievances to their employer.'
The Taft-Hartley Act added to the proviso so that it presently states:
99. Judge L. Hand expressed an even more liberal view: "Risk for risk, for myself,
I had rather take my chance that some traitors will escape detection than spread abroad
a general suspicion and distrust, which accepts rumor and gossip in place of undismayed
and unintimidated inquiry. I believe that that community is already in a process of
dissolution where each man begins to eye his neighbor as a possible enemy. .. ."
Address by Judge Learned Hand at the 86th Convocation of the University of the
State of New York, Oct. 24, 1952, at Albany, New York.
100. See Comment, 63 YALE L.J. 206 (1953) where it is stated: "Whether or not
a particular utilization of informers is constitutional should not be the decisive test;
often what escapes constitutional interdiction is nevertheless unwise or unfair." Id. at 230.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter expressed the same view in the following manner: "Civil
liberties draw at best only limited strength from legal guarantees. Preoccupation by
our people with the constitutionality, instead of with the wisdom, of legislation or of
executive action is preoccupation with a false value. . . . Focusing attention on con-
stitutionality tends to make constitutionality synonymous with wisdom." Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 555 (1951) (concurring opinion).
1. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 9(a), 42 Stat. 453 (1935).
